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THE JUDICIAL TREND TOWARD STUDENT
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
WILLIAM

w. VAN ALSTYNE*

The law that governs the prerogatives of college students and the powers
of universities consists of rising tiers of authority. From ad hoc administrative and faculty rules, the layers progress upward to the supreme law of
the Constitution. This brief discussion, however, concerns only one part of
this uppermost tier- the fourteenth amendment (plus portions of the Bill
of Rights to the extent they have been absorbed into the fourteenth amendment and made applicable to publicly-supported colleges). Additionally, not
even all of the fourteenth amendment shall be considered, but only two of its
several clauses in the first of its five sections.
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Virtually every significant change affecting student prerogatives and college
powers made within the past ten years has resulted from an authoritative
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, a fairly responsible
review of trends in the law of student prerogatives and college powers may
confine itself to an examination of judicial trends under the fourteenth
amendment and the Bill of Rights.
The fourteenth amendment is, of course, only a limitation on college
power. That is, college rules do not derive their authority from the fourteenth amendment, and no college need show that its rule-making power is
authorized by the fourteenth amendment. 1 The point is mild and self-evident,
but extremely important; those who would seek to displace or invalidate a
college rule by reliance upon the fourteenth amendment must sustain the
burden of showing in what manner a given college rule or action is forbidden
by or conflicts with the ultimate norms of the fourteenth amendment.
Still another preliminary observation needs to be made in narrowing the
field of our discussion. The amendment provides only that no "State" shall
deny due process or equal protection. Thus, while state colleges and state
universities are readily subject to its strictures the amendment would not appear to address itself to private colleges and universities. These, it may be
suggested, can operate freely without observing due process or equal protection. In this sense, the fourteenth amendment does not establish a "right" to
due process or to equal protection; rather, it merely provides a limited "immunity" - an immunity from state denials of due process or equal protection.
•B.A., 1934, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University; Certificate, 1961, The Hague Academy of International Law; Professor of Law, Duke University.
I. The affirmative source of rule-making power is to be sought in articles of incorporation, charters, state delegation of legislative prerogatives, subdelegations by boards of trustees, et cetera.
[290]
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In a larger and highly practical way, however, this preliminary observation is substantially false and our discussion is in fact relevant to many
colleges that regard themselves as private institutions. The concept of "state
action" has so far expanded, and the presence of government has so far penetrated, that very few colleges are today wholly "private" in the sense of being
altogether immune to the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights (the
latter applying to instrumentalities of the federal government and thus, to a
variable extent, to colleges with substantial federal involvements). The majority of new college building programs even at "private" colleges are currently underwritten by federal loans and insurance. Large numbers of fellowships, scholarships, and loans at "private" colleges ru;e supplied with federal
money. Government research contracts represent a rapidly growing percentage of college budgets, and local, state, and federal tax-exempt status
indirectly aid most colleges. As a consequence, the following dictum by the
Supreme Court becomes significant: 2
[W]hen authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the
scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.
Additionally, education itself has become increasingly regarded as a "public
function," just as a larger percentage of students currently attend publiclysupported institutions than ever before. We can no longer ignore the complex of federal court decisions that brings colleges and universities within
range of the fourteenth amendment. 8 These decisions equally emphasize the
2. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).
3. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (quasi-public nature of park plus continuation of some maintenance brings private
trustees of the park under the equal protection clause); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (privately-operated restaurant under arms-length lease
with public parking authority subject to equal protection clause. "Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance."); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (county-wide
private association's preprimary elections held subject to fifteenth amendment. "For a
state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse
of those processes."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (mere state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive private property covenant violates equal protection clause.
"Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination
which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement.");
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (privately-owned company town subject to
first amendment. "We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the
question. • • . The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."); Eaton v. Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964)
(private hospital receiving federal aid and performing "public function" subject to fourteenth
amendment); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd,
373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (orphans' school operated by private trustees but subject to some
state regulation held subject to fourteenth amendment); Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F.
Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962) (private university with state charter, some tax exemption, and
three public officials nominally on governing board subject to fourteenth amendment); Cf.
Green v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 6ll (D.D.C. 1967). The Green case is of doubtful
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"significant involvement" of government in formerly private educational
enterprises and the "public function" of education itself. It is important therefore, to note that many more colleges may be bound by constitutional norms
than are commonly regarded as being so bound. The subject having now been
put in focus, we move to an examination of recent judicial trends.
GENERAL TRENDS RESPECTING STUDENT STATUS

In 1925, the Florida Supreme Court reflected the perspective of courts
across the country in generously deferring to the autonomy and supposed
expertise of college administrations. In reversing a judgment secured against
Stetson University and its president by a girl indefinitely suspended following
a brief interrogation by the president who rather summarily determined that
the girl had created disturbances in a dormitory, the court observed: 4
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of
the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any regulation for their government which a parent
could make for the same purpose . . . .
[In the case of a private institution,] it is not incumbent on the institution to prefer charges and prove them at trial before dismissing permanently or temporarily a student regarded by it as undesirable.
An increasing number of state and federal courts have modified this
perspective substantially since 1961. The analogy of in loco pa,-entis has been
rejected, the importance of a student's interest in his academic status has
been upgraded, the definition of a "private" institution has been narrowed,
and the role of constitutional limitations has been expanded. Reviewing
recent federal court decisions last year, a California court of appeals observed: 5
The more recent federal cases stress the importance of education
to the individual and conclude that attendance in a state university
is no longer considered a privilege . . . . but is now regarded as an
important benefit ....
In the Dixon and Knight cases, it was held that procedural due
process required a hearing before students who participated in demonstrations violating laws concerning the separation of the races in public
places could be dismissed or suspended from the state university. As
authority for any of its asserted propositions in view of the fact that the court of appeals
ordered reinstatement of the ousted students pending a hearing on he merits, subject to the
holding of an orderly hearing within the college.); Green v. Howard Univ., Civil No. 1949
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 271
F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674
(E.D. La. 1962); University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1966). See also A. S. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION (1957); Van
Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 28-36 (1961); Note, Private Government
on the Campus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Comment, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 39 (1967).
4. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1925).
5. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 (Cal. App. 1967) (emphasis added).
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stated in Dixon: "The precise nature of the private · interest involved in this case is the right to remain at a public institution of
higher learning in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing.
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy
life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of good citizens." The court noted in Knight that:
"Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege,
the fact remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, especially to those students who have already enrolled in the institution
and begun the pursuit of their college training. Private interests are
to be evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of their true significance and worth."
For constitutional purposes, the better approach, as indicated in
Dixon, recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in loco
parentis in relation to thei1· students.
The Dixon case r~ferred to in the California opm10n, incidentally, is a
decision from the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which has
appellate jurisdiction over federal cases and controversies arising in the southeast, including Florida.6
There is nothing especially startling in the judicial determination to upgrade the students' claim in preserving their educational opportunity and
nothing startling in applying the constitutional norms in behalf of persons
under twenty-one years of age. In 1954, the Supreme Court observed: "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of a public education."7
Similarly, those under twenty-one years of age, including even those in
secondary schools, are not excepted from the protection of the fourteenth
amendment. In voiding a compulsory flag salute as applied to school children religiously opposed to such a state ceremony, Mr. Justice Jackson
observed in 1943: 8

The Fou1·teenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures- Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes.
6. The case is Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments."); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance."); Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 634 (1819) ("That education is an object of national concern . . .
all admit.").
8. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (emphasis added).
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SPECIFIC JUDICIAL TRENDS

Procedural Due Process9
Even minors cannot be disciplined in a manner affecting their substantial
interests without the observance of procedural due process. This proposition
received fresh support from the Supreme Court only last year. In prospectively requiring juvenile courts to improve the judicial nature of their
proceedings, the Court declared: 10
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the
powers which the state may exercise.

In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not
require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in
the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.
The jettisoning of in loco parentis was, it may be suggested, long overdue
in any case. For one thing, the mean age of American college students is
more than twenty-one years and there are, in fact, more students over the
age of thirty than younger than the age of eighteen.11 Even in Blackstone's
time, the doctrine did not apply to persons over twenty-one. 12 For another
thing, it is unrealistic to assume that relatively impersonal and large-scale
institutions can act in each case with the same degree of solicitous concern
as a parent reflects in the intimacy of his own home. The parent is doubtless
restrained in tempering discipline with parental love and concern. The institution, however, cannot hope to reflect the same intense degree of emotional
identification with those in attendance, no matter how well it may intend
otherwise. The institution is also subject to different practical concerns- to
keep its eye on reaction by the local press, disgruntlement among alumni, dis9. Further discussion of this subject can be found in Johnson, The Constitutional Rights
of College Students, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 344 (1964); Moneypenny, University Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REv. 739 (1967); Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due
Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 368 (1968); Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1045, Il28 et seq. (1968); Note, Expulsion of College and Professional StudentsRights and Remedies, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 174 (1963); Note, College Disciplinary Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REv. 819 (1965); Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Comment, School Expulsions
and Due Process, 14 KAN. L. REv. 108 (1965); Comment, The Constitutional Rights of
Students, 40 PHIL. L.J. 587 (1966); Comment, The College Student and Due Process in
Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REv. 87 (1968).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 19-20, 27-28 (1967).
II. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Population Characteristics, ser. P-20, No. IIO, at 12 (1961).
12. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 782-84 (8th ed. 1890).
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satisfaction among benefactors and others whose practical influences combine
to bring about an administrative perspective less loving and more divided
than a mother has for her own son or daughter. It simply blinks at reality
to treat the mother and the college as one and the same in drawing legal
analogies, no matter how frequently one refers to his alma mater for other
purposes. Finally, a parent's disciplinary authority does not extend to the
power literally to expel a dependent minor from his own home, but to lesser
penalties only. Yet, the typical sanction imposed by the alleged surrogate
parent, a college, is the sanction of expulsion itself- with all the serious
consequences to the student's future already noted above. As the analogy of
in loco parentis is several times false in fact, we need not be surprised nor
alarmed that it is now being discarded. Large scale collegiate operations, the
heterogeneity of their student bodies, the varying ages of their students, the
irreducible impersonality of their operation, and the grave consequences of
their disciplinary proceedings, all support the heightened requirements of
greater procedural fair play in their treatment of alleged violators of their
rules.
The immediate, practical, and constitutional result of these phenomena
is this: colleges and universities may no longer enforce their rules through
sanctions seriously jeopardizing a student's career in the absence of procedures that are fundamentally fair. The essential elements of fair procedure
include (but may not be limited to) the following requirements:
(I). Serious disciplinary action may not be taken in the absence of
published rules that: (a) are not "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application;"18 and (b) do not depend upon the unqualified discretion of a
particular administrator for their application.14
(2). Where the rules are reasonably clear and their application does
not depend upon uncontrolled discretion, a student still may not be
seriously disciplined (as by suspension) unless: (a) the student charged
with an infraction has been furnished with a written statement of the
charge adequately in advance of a hearing to enable him to prepare his
defense (for example, ten days); 15 (b) the student thus charged "shall be
permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing any affidavits or exhibits
which the college intends to submit at the hearing"; 16 (c) the student is
"permitted to have counsel present ... at the hearing to advise [him]";lT
(d) the student is "permitted to hear the evidence presented against
13. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267
U.S. 233 (1925); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
But see Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
14. Applied in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967).
15. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
16. Id. at 651.
17. Id.; Madera v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
Tev'd on otheT grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899
(Sup. Ct. 1967).
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him" 18 or at least "the student should be given the names of witnesses
against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each
witness testifies"; 19 (e) the student "(not his attorney) may question at
the hearing any witness who gives evidence against him"; 20 (f) those who
hear the case "shall determine the facts of each case solely on the evidence
presented at the hearing. . . ."; 21 (g) "the results and findings of the
hearing should be presented in a report open to the student's inspection"; 22
(h) "either side may, at its own expense, make a record of the events at
the hearing." 23
These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the standards required of criminal courts in their disposition of offenses punishable by fine or
short-term imprisonment. The comparison is not fortuitous because it is now
evident that expulsion or exclusion from college may, in the long run, disadvantage an individual at least as much as a single infraction of a criminal
statute. There should be no surprise, therefore, that students are entitled at
least to the same degree of due process as a suspected pickpocket. Indeed,
the requisites of due process still evolving from federal decisions are substantially less than standards already recommended by professional educational
associations. The Association of American Colleges (representing administrations of nearly 900 colleges), The American Association of University Pro·
fessors (representing about 86,000 full-time faculty at accredited institutions) ,
the National Student Association, the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, the National Association of Women Deans and
Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher Education have recently
approved a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, which goes
considerably beyond the requirements suggested in court decisions. 24

18. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
19. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 u.s. 930 (1961).
20. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 653 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
21. I d. at 652.
22. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
23. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
See also for particular treatments of these various requisites, ·woods v. 'Vright, 334 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1964); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966). See also the extraordinarily circum·
spect procedure used by the University of California and approved by the state court in
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). Cf. the lesser standards
held to be sufficient in Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dunmar v. Ailes,
348 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 277 F. Supp. IIO (S.D. Texas 1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). See also Butting v. Smily, No. C-666 (D. Colo. Feb. 2,
1968) (opinion by Arraj, J.); Soglin v. Kauffman, No. 67·6-141 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 1967)
(opinion by Doyle, J.).
24. See Appendix. See also the earlier ACLU statement, which the Joint Statement
parallels, A.C.L.U. Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and
Universities (rev. cd. 1965). The University of California, Berkeley, appears to provide
greater procedural safeguards that the Joint Statement. See REPORT OF THE STUDY COMliiiS·
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The late (and judicially conservative) Mr. Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[T]he history of liberty has largely been the history of observance
of procedural safeguards." 25 So it is with students, as with others.
Somewhat anticlimactically, however, it is necessary to note a few additional
matters in rendering out treatment of student procedural due process with
fuller accuracy:

(I). The federal cases involving procedural due process for students
have been disposed of by courts below the level of the United States Supreme Court and thus their utterances on this subject are not necessarily
the last word. Indeed, a number of federal courts disagree among themselves respecting the requisite degree of college due process. 26
(2). On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that additional safeguards may be imposed by the courts if it appears that complete fairness
is still not being observed. For instance, it is foreseeable that random
and unannounced searching of student rooms may be forbidden, that
students may not be coerced into admissions of misdeeds, and that some
greater degree of cross-sectional representation on hearing boards may
eventually be required.
(3). A clear distinction will probably continue to be made, however
respecting campus offenses carrying such relatively insubstantial penalties
(for example, social probation, minor fines, loss of auto privileges) that
formal due process is not demanded and may well be dispensed with
in the interest of administrative convenience.
(4). A distinction will probably continue to be made in instances where
students face the prospect of being dropped due to inadequate grades.
It is true, of course, that dismissal for academic deficiency may be as
serious to the student's educational career as dismissal for disciplinary
reasons, but quasi-judicial procedures are generally inadequate as means
of determining whether, for instance, an essay examination should have
been graded as a "C" rather than a "D." A lay panel may ordinarily
lack the competence of second-guessing grades. Only where the student's
complaint alleges egregious and almost willfully biased grading may the
college be required to provide some means of review, and even then the
review would presumably involve a panel of professors familiar with the
subject matter of the examination and who ·would follow a different
procedure than in a disciplinary case.27
(5). Finally, disciplinary proceedings are different from counselling
proceedings where the student does not stand in jeopardy of a penalty. 28
So long as the counsellor is required to respect the confidentiality of his
relationship and acts without power to impose punishment, no reason
exists to import an adversary or quasi-judicial procedure that would undermine the counsellor's essential functions.
SION ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE AND EDU·
CATION (1968). For similar institutional developments, see REPORT OF THE FAcULTY CoMMITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS TO THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL, MICH. STATE UNIV., ACADEMIC
FREEDOM FOR STUDENTS (1967); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAw (1967).
25. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). See also Irwin v. Doud, 366 U.S.
717, 729 (1961); similar statements by Frankfurter in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
414 (1945).
26. See cases cited note 23 supra.
27. See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
28. See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Cosme v. Board
of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966). .
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Political Freedoms 29
Second only to their concern with procedural due process, an increasing
number of courts have moved to circumscribe college power over political
freedoms that are constitutionally reserved to all persons including students.
There are two aspects of student political freedom that are especially topical
just now: (1) rules that regulate forms of expression or political activity by
the students themselves, on campus; (2) rules that regulate students in terms
of whom they may invite to hear on campus.
The first amendment explicitly provides protection for "freedom of
speech, of the press," the right "peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances." This protection extends to those
who are othenvise properly on a college or university campus, which is sufficiently "public" to be subject to the first or fourteenth amendment. It
operates as a limitation on college rule-making power to protect political expression and organizational activity by students, whether the subject of that
expression is directed to alleged grievances within the college itself or whether
the subject is an issue not especially related to the college itself. In order to
withstand criticism anchored in a claim of constitutional right, college rules
curtailing forms of political expression must generally satisfy the following
standards:
(1). They must be clear and specific, and free of such ambiguity that
their uncertain scope and application are so doubtful as themselves to
chill the exercise of orderly political expression; 30

29. Further discussions of this subject can be found in Pollitt, Campus Censorship:
Statutes Barring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963);
Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
lll U. PA. L. REv. 328 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the RuleMaking Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN
TRANSITION Q. I (1965); Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, ll28 (1968); Note,
State's Right To Abrogate First Amendment Guarantees in Regulation of State University
Speaker Programs, 42 TULANE L. REv. 394 (1968); Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Comment, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of
Students, 38 Miss. L. REv. 488 (1967).
30. See cases cited note 13 supra. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967) (faculty disclaimer oath void for vagueness); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S.
195, 200 (1966) ("Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First
Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating
conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.");
Id. at 200 (footnotes omitted); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (faculty disclaimer
oath void for vagueness); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (Florida
teachers' oath void for vagueness); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
695 (1959) (concurring opinion) ("The ultimate reason for invalidating such laws is that
they lead to timidity and inertia and thereby discourage the boldness of expression indispensable for a progressive society."). But see Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967).
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(2). They must confine themselves to restrictions that go no further
than to: (a) forbid modes of conduct that are manifestly unreasonable in
terms of time, place, or manner; 31 (b) forbid incitements made under
such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger of precipitating
a serious violation of law.s 2
Thus, a rule that broadly forbids "any student •.. [to engage on campus]
in any public demonstrations without prior approval of the College administration," is void on its face. It is a prior restraint devoid of proper standards
restricting its application to assemblies held at a time, place, or in such a
manner as to disrupt the school.33 Nor may a student editor be denied
registration for "insubordination" in failing to submit totally to censorship of
an editorial critical of the state legislature and for refusing to print in its
stead a canned story about "Raising Dogs in North Carolina" as demanded
by the college president.34 As the court declared in such a case: 35
A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitutionally
protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to his attending
a state-supported institution. State school officials cannot infringe on
their students' right of free and unrestricted expression . . • where
the exercise of such right does not "materially and substantially interfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school." The defendants in this case cannot punish Gary Clinton
Dickey for his exercise of this constitutionally guaranteed right by
cloaking his expulsion or suspension in the robe of "insubordination."
Similarly, students expressing a political view by wearing "freedom buttons"
cannot be suspended on the pretense that such things must be forbidden
to preserve discipline where in fact there has been no evidence of any physical
disorder.36
31. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (restriction on "raucous" volume
from sound trucks in business district upheld); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (purely provocative epithets at captive listener may be forbidden); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parade permit requirement upheld where issuance is
mandatory and applicant need supply only minimum information); Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (intimidation of fellow students to join
student protest may be forbidden); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(Cal. App. 1967) (noisy broadcast of obscene expressions in public on-campus places may
be forbidden). Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (use of libel insufficient even for civil restraint in absence of actual malice and in context of political expression); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (possibility of litter insufficient to justify
ban on political handbill distribution).
32. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schenck v. United States, 249
u. s. 47 (1919).
33. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
34. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
35. I d., at 618; Zander v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., Civ. Action No. 13,427 (W.D.
La. March 8, 1968) (expulsion of students who seized control of facilities to demonstrate
grievances upheld).
36. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Blackwell v. Issaguena County
Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal.
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Assemblies that are staged so as to congest access or passage, demonstrations
that become disruptive because of their noise, and expression that is imposed
on a semi-captive audience or offensively upon unwilling third parties, however, so clearly interfere with the reciprocal rights of others that they may
appropriately be forbidden under regulations neutrally limiting even political expression according to reasonable time, place, and manner. 37 Indeed,
the administrative inconvenience of having to accommodate ad hoc demonstrations in certain locations (for example, the president's office or inside a
classroom building), may justify a rule placing some facilities entirely off
limits as a political forum, even though a given demonstration might itself
not happen to be disruptive. 38
One other point is also well established and presumably applies on campuses as well. In regulating political expression, college authorities may not
formulate or apply rules that discriminate against competing points of view.
If placards or handbills favoring a given governmental policy may be distributed, a discriminatory ban on placards and handbills opposing that policy
will fall as a denial of equal protection. If an assembly is permitted where
students and faculty may comment on the evils of drug use, no curtain can be
drawn on others holding an opposing view. In short, the publicly-supported
college can no more engage in partisan censorship than government itself.
The view of Mr. Justice Holmes has been accepted on this matter: 39
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which [our] wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution.
The constitutional law on this matter follows the observation of John Stuart
Mill in his Essay on Liberty: 40

Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967); In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34 (Cal. App.
1966). Burnside v. Byars was expressly not followed in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), afl'd by equally divided court,
383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, ...... U.S ....... , 88 S. Ct. 1050 (1968) (ban on wearing
black arm bands to protest Viet Nam policy upheld) and the two cases are well worth comparing. Burnside, a fifth circuit decision, is controlling in the southeastern United States.
37. See cases cited note 21 supra.
38. Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (U.S. April 22, 1968); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (trespass statute applied to curtilage of jailhouse against
scarcely disruptive demonstrators upheld); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (dictum
that demonstrations on courthouse steps may be wholly forbidden). But see Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace conviction for quietly standing in
anteroom of public library without evidence of interference with others and to protest library segregation practices reversed). See also Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief
of Capitol Police, 278 F. Supp. 233 (1968), which is difficult to reconcile with Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
39. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
40. J- S. Mill, On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women, in
THE WoRLD'S CLASSICS (1966).

1968]

JUDICIAL TREND TOWARD STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM

301

Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the
very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of
action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have
any rational assurance of being right.
It is in this context that the Supreme Court has suggested: 41
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident.... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherw·ise our civilization will stagnate and die.

[E]ducation, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political
neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or
faction.
Here again, however, the courts have provided no greater protection for
students than that which has already been accepted by a significant number
of educational associations. Thus, the Joint Statement on Student Rights and
Freedoms provides:
Students and student organizations should be free to examine and
to discuss all questions of interest to them, and to express opinions
publicly and privately. They should always be free to support causes
by orderly means which do not disrupt the regular and essential operation of the institution. At the same time, it should be clear to the
academic and the larger community that in their public expressions
or demonstrations students or student organizations speak only for
themselves.
On the related political freedom - the rights of students to invite and to
hear guest speakers on campus - the trend of judicial decision closely parallels
the trend with respect to the students' own freedom of expression on campus.
The courts have come to recognize that an individual cannot be made to
relinquish those rights which he holds as a citizen (including the right to
hear) as a condition of attending college. The college may generally regulate
the appearance of invited guest speakers only to an . equivalent extent as
may a civil polity regulate public facilities that are otherwise suitable as
meeting places. It may establish neutral priorities (for example, giving
preference to a regular academic event over an invitation to a guest speaker
sought to be scheduled for the same time). It may require that sponsoring
organizations submit sufficient information to enable university officials an
orderly means of allocating facilities. It may oblige the speaker to assume full
41. First quotation is from Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Second
quotation is from West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). See also
dicta on academic freedom in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and discussion in text infra, regarding the same problem with respect to discrimination among
guest speakers on campus.
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responsibility for any violation of law involved in his own conduct. It
probably may require a statement that the views presented are not necessarily
those of the institution or of the sponsoring group. But it may neither proceed by rules that are vague or that reserve unchecked discretion to censor,
nor may it screen speakers according to their political affiliation, their subject matter, or their point of view. Nor will the answer be allowed that
speakers can be banned without violating anyone's freedom to hear on the
ground that the college's own faculty already adequately considers all points
of view in class. As Mill pointed out: 42
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from
his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by
what they offer as refutation. That is not the way to do justice to
the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind.
He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them;
who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He
must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must
feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject
has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never possess himself of
the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty.
Recent case illustrations of these conclusions are at hand. A 1965 North
Carolina statute requiring the trustees of the consolidated state university
system to adopt special rules governing the appearance of "known members
of the Communist Party" was declared void for vagueness by a federal court
only this year.43 Similarly, a rule permitting use of a college auditorium by
outside organizations "insofar as these are determined to be compatible with
the aims of Hunter College as a public institution of higher learning," was
held to be void for vagueness. 44
Even where the regulation may be clear, it may deny equal protection
where it bars speakers according to their political affiliation, the popularity
of their views, or some other standard that goes to the background of the
speaker rather than the legality of the manner in which he proposes to speak.

42. J. S. MILL, supra note 40, at 47.
43. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). There are additional
holdings of considerable importance that do not appear in the opinion but which are
implicit in the court's disposition of the case. In reaching the merits and holding in favor
of the plaintiffs, the court necessarily held (a) that the students and speakers had standing,
(b) that the issue had not become moot merely because the particular date for which the
speakers had been scheduled had passed, (c) that the abstention doctrine did not apply.
All of these issues were tendered by defendants' various motions to dismiss. The treatment of these issues appears to have been correct. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 88 S. Ct. 391
(1968); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (addressee of mail has standing
to contest conditions imposed on mail); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (abstention held inappropriate); East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,
19 N.Y.2d 605, 278 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967) (action for declaratory judgment not moot where
court has jurisdiction, dispute of recurring nature, parties adverse, free speech the issue,
and rule challenged on its face).
44. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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Thus, the California Supreme Court has struck down a ban against "subversive elements" on grounds of equal protection (rather than on vagueness
alone): 45
It is true that the state need not open the doors of a school building as
a forum and may at any time choose to close them. Once it opens the
doors, however, it cannot demand tickets of admission in the form of
convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable:
The New York and California courts were, in this regard, merely following
standards established years earlier by the United States Supreme Court: 46
The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to
be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but
whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of
speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have
committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted
for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses,
seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.
On the same analysis precisely, speaker bans in Mississippi and Louisiana were
recendy set asideP
Again, however, the Constitution has been interpreted as requiring no
more than professional associations have themselves recommended. The
Joint Statement provides in this respect:
Students should be allowed to invite and to hear any person of
their own choosing. Those routine procedures required by an institution before a guest speaker is invited to appear on campus should be
designed only to insure that there is orderly scheduling of facilities and
adequate preparation for the event, and that the occasion is conducted
in a manner appropriate to an academic community. The institutional
45. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885, 892 (1946).
Same ground used as alternative holding in Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d
924 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
46. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
47. See Stacy v. Williams, Cause No. WC 6725 (N.D. Miss., June 30, 1967) (temporary
restraining order issued July 7, 1967). (The statute is discussed in Comment, Mississippi's
Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students,
38 MISS. L. REv. 488 (1967)). Student Liberal Federation v. Louisiana State Univ. at New
Orleans, Civ. Action No. 68-300 (E.D. La., Feb. 13, 1968) (temporary restraining order
issued Feb. 15, 1968, Heebe, J.). (The statute is discussed in Note, State's Right To Abrogate First Amendment Guarantees in Regulation of State University Speaker Programs, 42
TULANE L. REv. 394 (1968)). For cases ruling against litigants seeking to ban speakers on
campus see Cannon v. Towner, 138 Misc. 955, 70 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Egan v.
Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.E.2d 842,
250 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964); Donato v. Board of Educ., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Weschester Co., Jan. 30,
1967.
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control of campus facilities should not be used as a device of censorship. It should be made clear to the academic and larger community
that sponsorship of guest speakers does not necessarily imply approval
or endorsement of the views expressed, either by the sponsoring group
or the institutions.
In closing this brief article, I want to emphasize again that we have been
discussing judicial trends rather than legal certainties. The Supreme Court
has not definitely considered the scope of student political freedom on
campus or the scope of student procedural due process, and a number of
state courts as well as some federal courts would not necessarily reach the
results reported in this article. Nonetheless, it is correct to state that a trend
is evident, and I believe it to be a fair prophecy that the trend will continue.
I should hope, however, that the abrasive last resort of unwelcome litigation
may be avoided and that the principles we have discussed will gather voluntary support on the basis that they reflect sound and enlightened educational
policy. Wholly apart from the legal compulsion which may support them,
these principles are surely no more than those that self-respecting institutions
of higher learning should freely desire to secure as worthwhile in themselves.
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APPENDIX

THE JOINT STATEMENT ON RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF STUDENTS provides in part:
B. Investigation of Student Conduct.
(1). Except under extreme emergency circumstances, premises occupied by students
and the personal possessions of students should not be searched unless appropriate
authorization has been obtained. For premises such as residence halls controlled by the
institution, an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated to whom
application should be made before a search is conducted. The application should specify
the reasons for the search and the objects or information sought. The student should
be present, if possible, during the search. For premises not controlled by the institution,
the ordinary requirements for lawful search should be followed.
(2). Students detected or arrested in the course of serious violations of institutional
regulations, or infractions of ordinary law, should be informed of their rights. No form
of harassment should be used by institutional representatives to coerce admissions of
guilt or information about conduct of other suspected persons.
C. Status of Student Pending Final Action. Pending action on the charges, the status of
a student should not be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to at·
tend classes suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or emotional safety
and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty,
or university property.
D. Hearing Committee Procedures. When the misconduct may result in serious penalties
and if the student questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against him, he
should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing before a regularly constituted
hearing committee. The following suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of
formality:
(1). The hearing committee should include faculty members or students, or, if
regularly included or requested by the accused, both faculty and student members. No
member of the hearing committee who is otherwise interested in the particular case
should sit in judgment during the proceeding.
(2). The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons for the proposed
disciplinary action with sufficient particularity, and in sufficient time, to insure opportunity to prepare for the hearing.
(3). The student appearing before the hearing committee should have the right to
be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his choice.
(4). The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bringing the charge.
(5). The student should be given an opportunity to testify and to present evidence
and witnesses. He should have an opportunity to hear and question adverse witnesses.
In no case should the committee consider statements against him unless he has been
advised of their content and of the names of those who made them, and unless he has
been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable inferences which might otherwise be
drawn.
·
(6). All matters upon which the decision may be based must be introduced into
evidence at the proceeding before the hearing committee. The decision should be based
solely upon such matter. Improperly acquired evidence should not be admitted.
(7). In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest and a verbatim
record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing.
(8). The decision of the hearing committee should be final, subject only to the
student's right of appeal to the President or ultimately to the governing board of the
institution.

